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Abstract 
An understanding of instrumentally valuable nature resulted from anthropocentrism is incapable of producing long-term, real 
solutions to deal with environmental problems. It is obvious that these problems cannot be handled staying within the current  
understanding of nature-human relationship and without broaden the extent of ethics in a way to involve non-human entities. 
Human beings are prone to protect what they consider as intrinsically valuable. Further, they have a tendency to value the things 
around them and it can be improved. Thus, a big part of this can be succeeded through environmental education. Therefore, in 
this paper, I discuss the role of intrinsic value in terms of environmental education to handle the environmental problems, and 
investigate a new account of subjective intrinsic value about nature. 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent increase in environmental problems forced human beings to search for a new environmental ethics to 
handle them, and for that reason to reconsider their relation with nature. It is recognized that, the technological 
and/or scientific developments, the governmental policies and/or legal restrictions are not capable of overcoming the 
environmental problems alone unless people change their prevailing attitude to nature. Because, there is no such a 
law that has control over every behaviour of human beings, and penetrates every detail of life; only ethics has such a 
power on human life.  
However, the traditional account of nature is anthropocentric: that is, only human beings are intrinsically 
valuable.When we look at the history, we see two main approaches to nature in the Western culture that lies 
behind human-centered approach. According to the first one, nature is regarded as passive; therefore, people 
think they are the masters and possessors of nature. Since nature serves to man, he can use it as a tool, and can 
modify it in the way he wants. According to the second approach, nature has potential, and the task of man is to help 
it for actualizing itself by means of arts, science, philosophy, technology, etc. (Passmore, 1995). As a consequence 
of anthropocentrism, the main motive that drives people to protect nature was a fear of the depletion of natural 
resources and concern about the future of human race, etc. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, the growing amount of 
environmental problems cannot be handled staying within the current understanding of human-nature relation. 
On the other hand, human beings unarguably have a tendency to value. They are inevitably valuing things around 
them: their families, works, hobbies, political views, religion, and foods they found delicious, etc. Thus, they can 
value non-human entities in nature as well as themselves. The controversial point is whether this valuation is 
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intrinsic or instrumental. Intrinsic value is one of the most problematic and obscure concepts of value theory, in 
. It can be said that, if X is valuable for the sake of 
something else, it is instrumentally valuable, but if X is valuable for its own sake, then it is intrinsically valuable. 
Why is intrinsic value important for nature and environmental education? Because, if nature has intrinsically 
valuable entities other than human beings, then, (contrary to present situation that people need to be justified their 
demand of non-intervene to nature) any demand of intervene to it would need to be justified(Callicott, 1999). The 
most powerful tool that may prevent the exploitation of nature is the intrinsic value that nature has, and the tendency 
of ability to value that human beings have. His -ability can be 
cultivated. For example, in earlier centuries, because of master-slave distinction among humans, not all people were 
regarded as intrinsically valuable. However, nowadays people harshly criticize such discriminations, and every 
person is regarded as intrinsically valuable. Further, as the time passes, our values change. We may disvalue the 
things previously valued, also value the things previously disvalued. For example, since marriage is not regarded as 
much blessed as before, nowadays living together as an unmarried couple is no more regarded as blameworthy or 
breaking up a marriage is not regarded as an offense. Therefore, at this point, education may have an important 
mission. Because, improvement of value-ability concerning non-human entities in nature can be succeeded largely 
through an environmental education. On the other hand, unless environmental education is based on a proper 
theoretical foundation, it will continue to fall short of introducing real, genuine solutions to environmental 
problems. In other words, during the construction of an environmental education program, if the intrinsic value 
of natural entities and nature itself is ignored, then that environmental education is condemned to be 
unsuccessful to realize its objective(s). For example, as a consequence of an environmental education grounded 
on anthropocentric approach, when it is to the benefit of human being, people more easily sacrifice or shut 
their eyes to extinction of an animal kind.  
Now, even though the existence of intrinsic value is widely accepted, it is still a controversial issue whether this 
intrinsic value is objective or subjective. In other words, is the intrinsic value independent of the valuation of a 
valuer? To clarify that point firstly, I examine the objective account of intrinsic value and then the subjective 
account of value that I also defend. 
2. Objective Intrinsic Value 
Defenders of objective intrinsic value claim that it is independent from valuation of a human being. H. Rolston 
III. (2003), a vigorous advocate of objective intrinsic value, claims that in being a valuer, human beings do not cause 
the existence of the value in objects or events. Intrinsic value is not something gained; it is already possessed by the 
object itself. Therefore, it cannot be said that there were no value before humans came in. Values exist objectively; 
they exist independently of human beings. Further, he argues that human beings are not the unique valuer; animals, 
organisms, species, etc. can also create value, i.e., they are also value-able (Rolston, 1991). When we observe 
animals, we see that, animals defend themselves against any danger. Thus, it can be said that an animal values its 
own life for what it is in-itself. In addition, animals care for their young and nourish them, etc. Their young are 
valuable for those animals. For example, a mother cat is able to value its kitty (Rolston, 2003). Rolston claims that 
t is already possessed. Therefore, value needs only the 
consciousness of a valuer that comprehends and discloses its value. Humans merely shed light on them (Rolston, 
re fuel that nature 
 
Additionally, human beings are not the only species that are intrinsically valuable because of a distinctive 
property, such as rationality. Non-human entities also have such distinctive properties that human beings lack, such 
2001). These properties may also render these animals intrinsically valuable. 
3. Subjective Intrinsic Value 
Contrary to objectivists, I defend the position that, every value implies the existence of a valuing subject, who 
evaluates it. Valuation is not a human-neutral process. Since morality is an issue peculiar to humankind, whatever 
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has intrinsic value is related somehow to the person who evaluates it. Although values may not be directly related to 
human-interest, without existence of a human being we cannot talk about value. An intrinsic value or intrinsically 
valuable thing has to be valued by someone in order to be regarded as a value or valuable. Nevertheless, it does not 
mean that all values depend on human-interest. Valuation is an intentional act of the subject; but as Calliout stated it 
may not always be a conscious act. He gives the example of a philanderer; he may not realize the fact that he loves 
his wife until she leaves him (Callicott, 1999). 
I claim that, although there are some intrinsic values in nature independent of usefulness of human-interest, their 
valuation is not independent of human beings. Rolston (2003) gives the 
as a proof of the existence of an objective intrinsic value. However, since caring her young is something that a 
human being values, while observing the mother cat of caring its kitty, a person attributes the value to that 
relationship between them. In other words, the value this person ascribes to situation is the result of the reflection of 
human valuation.In this example, since caring the young is something valuable for human beings, a person regards 
the relationship between the mother cat and the kitten as intrinsically valuable; even he does not have any interest in 
them. Thus, the valuation here is independent of human interest but it is not human-neutral either; whole valuation 
process is human-related. Within a valuation, human beings can be a direct valuer or an indirect valuer. Since 
human beings are indirect valuers in the example Rolston proposed, it misleads us to the idea that these values exist 
independent of human moral reasoning. Human beings always involve in valuation, implicitly or explicitly, i.e., 
directly or indirectly. Because, without evaluation of a human valuer, one cannot plausibly talk about the existence 
of any value neither intrinsic nor instrumental. 
Routley (1973) pr
only one person left in the world. He knows that he will die soon. From an anthropocentric perspective, there is 
nothing wrong in destroying all plants and animals before he dies. Because, a world without human beings has no 
value. However, if you are also inclined to think that the last man does something morally wrong, then this argument 
can be evidence for of the fact that human beings value nature not only instrumentally but also intrinsically. The 
they do not exist 
seems incompatible with subjectivism. However, I think, the last person argument can be merely an evidence for the 
existence of intrinsically valuable thing(s) in nature independently of human-interest. The last person argument can 
be a foundation for a non-anthropocentric ethics, but the argument does not say anything about the objectiveness or 
subjectiveness of intrinsic value. The important point missed is that, when you value something intrinsically, you do 
not damage it intentionally and not want to see its being damaged; rather you try to protect it. For example, a 
philosopher, who intrinsically values her/his books, does not think that after s/he is gone, they will lose their value, 
so all of her/his books can be burned. On the contrary, s/he believes that if s/he were alive s/he would find them 
valuable, thus, they continue to be worthy of their value. Besides, when a mother, intrinsically values her child, she 
is aware that the value she ascribed to child is subjective. However, she does not think that the child will become 
valueless with her death. This is the point that differs in intrinsic value from an instrumental one. 
4. The Universality of Subjective Value 
Now, it can be asked whether valuation is a human-related process, then what will save people from falling into 
the trap of an excessive amount of subjectiveness that may drag them into a moral solipsism. The answer is: the 
same biogenetic structure and the psychological disposition that human beings share.  
Like anthropocentrism, the anthropogenic approach, I defend, accepts that value requires a valuer, in other words, 
value can be generated by human valuers only. However, different from anthropocentrism value is not only for 
humans. An anthropogenic value theory finds value only in the subjectivity of humans (thus it is subjectivist), but 
the problem of subjectivism (i.e. subjectivist relativism) which may emerge, can be handled by human 
biopsychological nature. According to such a biopsychological subjectivism, although intrinsic value is not an 
intrinsic property of objects, (since humans have a shared-tendency to attribute intrinsic value to objects) it is 
plausible to say that this value can be universalized.  
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Y. S. Lo proposes a dispositional moral theory substantially based on Humean principle that what is 
valuable/invaluable disapprobation of an action/behavior/object (Lo, 2009). Concerning 
 
history. They are not fixed absolutes but malleable to some extent. If T  is right in understanding value as 
 dispositions, then value can be created and relative values can 
become more universal, to the extent that people can cultivate, negotiate about, and converge in, their 
evaluative dispositions (Lo, 2009). 
Biologic/evolutionary and also social changes that human beings have had until now, lead an increase in their 
tendency to value nature and also to protect what they value. Compared to before, they rarely sacrifice the things 
they value. For example, an arbitrary hunting is banned in many countries, and in the case of necessity, it is done as 
painlessly as possible.  
Although the motives that lead us to seek a new environmental ethics may be anthropocentric, it does not 
necessarily follow that new ethics necessarily have to be anthropocentric. To make this e
(2006) dispositional moral theory. Lo, takes the Humean sense of justice as a model for her theory. Since the motive 
behind it is egoistic/self-centered, Hume regards justice as an artificial virtue. Hume says, although a single act of 
individual. If every individual look out for his/her own interests, and does not pursue justice then the society will 
dissolve and people would become savage, misery, solitary condition that is the worst position for a society it can be 
imagined (Hume, 1939). Without a society, individuals are weak, they are not capable of doing all things alone and 
any particular skills they possess c
depends on mutual convention of people at the formation of society. However, as much as people pursue it, it is 
internalized, cultivated and regarded as an intrinsic value as if it were a natural virtue. Consequently, people can 
generate intrinsically valuable environmental values to solve environmental problem with the help of a well-
designed environmental education like Humean justice. 
it and liability to value it. For example, we have tendency to be able to value our dog or cat more than a wild animal. 
Therefore, frequency of relationship affects value-giving ability. Consequently, it can be said that acquaintance can 
be fulfilled by an environmental education program. 
One can be asked as to what can be the ground for the value that human beings subjectively attribute to 
nature/environment and to non-human entities in nature. I think, respect (for example, for their will to survive), 
admiration (for example, to stability and integrity of ecosystem, diversity, beauty, etc.), sympathy (based on feeling 
pain and pleasure) can be the reasons which are behind a valuation process. 
5. Conclusion 
The traditional western account of ethics is widely affected by religion (people behave in a good way, because 
God commands or they want to merit heaven, etc.) However, when ethics is separated from religion, what is left as 
the purpose of ethics is to put social life in order
beings can co-exist in sustainably ha I think, the 
definition should be reformulated in a way to include nature: the purpose of ethics is to answer how human beings 
and non-human entities can co-exist within nature in sustainably happy and flourishing ways, and to assist them 
doing so. 
To sum up, a continual environmental ethics can only be anthropogenic. Further, I reject the objectivistic 
interpretation of intrinsic value, which claims the existence of value independently of human beings as valuers. I 
think valuation is a relational process between a valuer and the object to be valued. The worth of an object is the 
 
Lo defines T: X is (relatively/universally) valuable/disvaluable just if (some/all) human subjects are disposed, under favorable 
conditions {C}, to feel the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation toward X. 
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worth that it gained within a relation with the human valuer. Besides, trying to isolate an object from all relations 
may lead to an error in valuation; also, such isolation seems almost impossible. 
Nature is a kind of community, and human beings are members of that community as well as plants, animals, etc. 
They are all dependent on each other for existence (Passmore separation of self from nature that is 
members of nature; man does not have the right to reshape, exploit and/or transform nature. In a society, it is hard to 
mention goodness or badness of an act that solely concerns only one person, isolating him/her from other members 
of a society. Because interests of that person may coincide with the interests of another one. This approach is also 
applicable to nature-human relation. Since they are also members of the same biotic community, we cannot mention 
 
Huey- ns and natural environment has been crucial 
change environmental attitudes, emotions and beliefs through increasing environmental knowledge. Therefore, the 
source and nature of the knowledge, which will be given through the environmental education, has a vital 
importance to reach the intended aim. Creation of non-anthropocentric intrinsic values in nature, and cultivation and 
internalization of them through a well-designed environmental education can lead to genuine environment friendly 
behaviours. Further, to reach the real and long-term solutions to environmental problems, first step aimed by 
environmental education should be creating awareness about the environment issues, and by means of that 
awareness improving the knowledge on environment. Because if we are not aware of the situation, we cannot focus 
on it and cannot change it. 
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